Customer Reviews: Read 12 more reviews...
 The most Spirited Attack on the method of Induction yet devised April 11, 2008
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Completed some time after he had immigrated to New Zealand upon fleeing Nazi Germany, this, one of Popper's most important and well-known works, is where he first introduces his solution to the problem of induction. According to Popper, scientific theories can never be proven; they can only be tested and confirmed or "falsified." In short, theories are mere hunches: more or less guided speculation, that must undergo continuous and rigorous testing and are subject to being overthrown at any time, including even after they have been rigorously tested. Popper's main point is that theories, are never completely proven, whether tested or not, they must remain available to falsification.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery was thus aimed primarily at pseudo-science and the pseudo-scientist (or at least at what Popper saw as the dangers of pseudo-science). Eventually the attack developed here became a full-scale broadside against the technique and process of inductive reasoning and of all scientific progress and theorizing that had been advanced on the basis of such reasoning.
Popper contends here (as does Hume and his other fellow Logical Positivists) that induction -- and presumably this includes mathematical induction, which many believe to be on a somewhat sounder footing than ordinary inductive reasoning -- was not logical. Among those that Popper considered a practicing pseudo-scientist, was none other than the great Sigmund Freud and his psychoanalytic theories of consciousness, which Popper considered to be dangerous pseudo-science.
Before this book was written, the best defense against the logical hole in induction was that put forth by the other Logical Positivists. They had rested their hat on a technique they coined as the "Principle of Verification," which was designed consciously as a temporary stopgap to close the logical hole that they all knew existed in inductive reasoning. Here Popper analyzes this principle and concludes that even though it is indeed a sounder form of induction, it remains induction no less: that is, it too is not logical. The "Principle of Verification" which required that theories be capable of passing rigorously designed scientific tests in Popper's eyes was just a halfway house between "pure induction" and Popper's more stringent criterion introduced for the first time in this book called the "Principle of "Falsification." Falsification turned the "Principle of Verification" on its head, by requiring that every proposition be falsifiable, and thus logical through the backdoor of being forever open to testing.
For the better part of four decades, Popper's principle of falsification reigned supreme in science, but now cracks have begun to develop, and many scientists, including some of his fellow logical positivists are beginning to give inductive reasoning and the Principle of Verification a second look. Despite these emerging reconsiderations of Popper's work, this book (which is dense and heavy going, and difficult to read in most of the middle parts), and his principle of falsification, Popper has nevertheless assured himself a well-deserved place in the annals of the history of the philosophy of science.
Five Stars
Essential Reading April 6, 2008
0 out of 1 found this review helpful
This book is essential reading for every undergrad. Empiricism should be taken to heart by anyone engaged in social or natural sciences. Shamefully, it tends to be forgotten in both, in favor of a pseudo-science of studying "concepts" or "models" instead of facts.
Social sciences are behavioral. They study human behavior, and therefore are purely empirical. Natural sciences are observational and experimental, and therefore also empirical. Yet, even some geologists (in my experience) tend to forget to examine the world as it is and instead fall back lazily on a fake intellectualism of model-driven thinking.
A philosphical classic June 18, 2007
1 out of 1 found this review helpful
Not exactly light reading, but a great reference work, and a clear expostion of Popper's Falsificationism. This methodology is widely regarded as the leading tool for demarcating between science and non-science or pseudo-science.
Very interesting December 24, 2006
5 out of 5 found this review helpful
I have to ask myself, "What is the basis for my scientific knowledge?" On a daily basis, as I am a chemist. I have often been struck by arguments for "induction" as lacking credibility, because how can one argue of probabilities with an unknown sample size? Popper argues that a proposing scientific hypothesis is an inductive act, but it is a creative act not a logical one, but that scientific knowledge is dedective.
I agree with him. The nature of science is such that one must put for statements about how the world works and test them. A scientist should always try to find a way of proving himself or herself wrong. If the predictions of the test are shown to be false, then the hypothesis must be false. That is the basis of scientific knowledge. The rest, the best theories we have are just "working models" and we can never justify why they work. They're simply our best working models now.
I don't find Popper's argument disheartening. Popper points out that we don't have to justify our search for explanations of the world, because they may do us benefit (if we happened to live in a world with stable physical laws, for instance).
I think many scientists would fundamentally agree that the laws of nature can never really be proven. They can't, but they speak volumes about what is relevant to us as a species (which is why Popper's argument that "induction" is creative is so interesting). All Popper asks of a scientific hypothesis is that it can, in principle, be demonstrated false by experience.
This is by far one of the most interesting and (I feel) important books I've ever read.
Popper's magnum opus November 23, 2006
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
The Logic of Scientific Discovery is in my view Karl Popper's finest work. When I studied science I was amazed at the insight Popper had into the scientific method of inquiry, and I admired his refusal to accept intellectual garbage.
While Popper has come under strong attack from both scientists and philosophers for several shortcomings in his work, in my view Popper has framed one of the most important studies of scientific knowledge and how it is gained, and the difference between science and non-science.
I agree with Popper's argument that the key feature of scientific theories is that they are 'falsifiable.' By this Popper simply meant that a scientific theory, even if beautiful, can be shown wrong by empirical observation. While this account is no doubt oversimplified and leaves out the key social and historical dimensions to science (which thinkers such as Kuhn addressed later on), this principle remains central to science; as Feynman said, 'If it disagrees with experiment, it is wrong.' The fallibility of science in Popper's view was the key to its strength, in contrast to pseudo-sciences such as Marxism and Freudian psychology, which while containing elements of truth, set themselves up as infallible truths and glossed over things which contradicted the belief system.
Popper also wrote many other philosophical works, including an important study of the difference between democratic political societies and ones ruled by totalitarian ideaology. However, he rightly deserves fame as one of the most important 20th century philosophers of science.
|
