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Dealers of Lightning: XEROX-PARC and the Dawn of the Computer Age | 
enlarge | Author: Michael A. Hiltzik Creator: Forrest Sawyer Publisher: HarperAudio Category: Book
List Price: $25.00 Buy New: $6.25 You Save: $18.75 (75%)
New (3) Used (12) from $1.98
Avg. Customer Rating: 44 reviews Sales Rank: 2050118
Format: Abridged, Audiobook Media: Audio Cassette Edition: Abridged Number Of Items: 4 Shipping Weight (lbs): 0.3 Dimensions (in): 7.1 x 4.1 x 1.1
ISBN: 0694521302 Dewey Decimal Number: 004.072079473 EAN: 9780694521302 ASIN: 0694521302
Publication Date: April 1, 1999 Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days Shipping: Expedited shipping available Condition: New, still sealed, box a little smooshed and the back of the box slightly damaged at UPC
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| Editorial Reviews:
Amazon.com Review Throughout the '70s and '80s, Xerox Corporation provided unlimited funding to a renegade think tank called the Palo Alto Research Center (PARC). Occupying a ramshackle building adjacent to Stanford University, PARC's occupants would prove to be the greatest gathering of computer talent ever assembled: it conceptualized the very notion of the desktop computer, long before IBM launched its PC, and it laid the foundation for Microsoft Windows with a prototype graphical user interface of icons and layered screens. Even the technology that makes it possible for these words to appear on the screen can trace its roots to Xerox's eccentric band of innovators. But despite PARC's many industry-altering breakthroughs, Xerox failed ever to grasp the financial potential of such achievements. And while Xerox's inability to capitalize upon some of the world's most important technological advancements makes for an interesting enough story, Los Angeles Times correspondent Michael Hiltzik focuses instead on the inventions and the inventors themselves. We meet fiery ringleader Bob Taylor, a preacher's son from Texas known as much for his ego as for his uncanny leadership; we trace the term "personal computer" back to Alan Kay, a visionary who dreamed of a machine small enough to tuck under the arm; and we learn how PARC's farsighted principles led to collaborative brilliance. Hiltzik's consummate account of this burgeoning era won't improve Xerox's stake in the computer industry by much, but it should at least give credit where credit is due. Recommended. --Rob McDonald
Product Description Dealers of Lightning is the riveting story of the legendary Xerox PARC--a collection of eccentric young inventors brought together by Xerox Corporation at a facility in Palo Alto, California, during the mind-blowing intellectual ferment of the seventies and eighties. Here for the first time Michael Hiltzik, a correspondent for the Los Angeles Times, reveals in piercing detail the true story of the extraordinary group that aimed to bring about a technological dawn that would change the world--and succeeded. Based on extensive interviews with the scientists, engineers, administrators, and corporate executives who lived the story, Dealers of Lightning takes the read on a journey from PARC's beginnings in a dusty, abandoned building at the edge of the Stanford University campus to its triumph as a hothouse of ideas that spawned not only the first personal computer, but the windows-style graphical user interface, the laser printer, much of the indispensable technology of the Internet, and a great deal more. It shows how and why Xerox, despite its willingness to grant PARC unlimited funding and the responsibility for developing breakthroughs to keep the corporation on the cutting edge of office technology, remained forever unable to grasp (and, consequently, exploit) the innovations that PARC delivered--and it details the increasing frustration of the original PARC scientists, many of whom would go on to build their fortunes upon the very ideas Xerox so rashly discarded. More than just a riveting historical narrative, Dealers of Lightning brings to life an unforgettable cast of characters. Among them: Bob Taylor--the preacher's son from rural Texas who would be considered a prophet by some and a cantankerous egomaniac by others, whose fearless (and feared) leadership of a team of computer renegades made them the heroes of the embryonic Silicon Valley; Jack Goldman--the Xerox chief scientist who convinced the stolid corporation to stake tens of millions of dollars on PARC while warning that the investment might not pay off for years--if it paid off at all; Alan Kay--PARC's creative and philosophical soul, who suffered years of ridicule for envisioning a computer that could be tucked under the arm yet would contain the power to store books, symphonies, letters, poems, and drawings--until he arrived at Palo Alto and met the people who would build it; and Steve Jobs--who, aided by Xerox's indifference to PARC's most momentous inventions, staged a daring raid to obtain the technology that would end up at the heart of the Macintosh: the machine that for a time helped Apple dominate an explosive new market. Dealers of Lightning is an unprecedented look at the ideas, the inventions, and the individuals that propelled Xerox PARC to the frontier of technohistory--and the corporate machinations that almost prevented it from achieving greatness.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 39 more reviews...
Early Computers history is very interesting October 25, 2007 I loved to read this book. It's interesting. It shows you how the thing that we use today, like the GUIs, laser printers, ethernet, and more were developed in XEROX PARC. Who were the people that had the vision to make these things live. They changed everything and ironically were misunderstood in their time. I really enjoyed reading this book,
STRICTLY A CUT AND PASTE JOB February 5, 2007 0 out of 9 found this review helpful
DEVOID OF INSIGHT OR ORIGINAL THOUGHT HILTZIG CONTINES TO TAKE CREDIT FOR OTHER PEOPLES RESEARCH AND THEN STATES IN A MOST BORING NANNER.
deep geek history that strains to be more mainstream than it can be January 10, 2007 3 out of 3 found this review helpful
Perhaps because of Xerox' s phenomenal growth in the 1960s, a number of habits became entrenched in the company's culture. The Xerox management hierarchy became one of rigid top-down control, which paid less attention to the opinions of its customers than the cost-and-quantity inputs of its financial models. At the end of the decade, Xerox was a one-product company that had come to rely more on patents to maintain its monopoly than on copier reliability and customer service, in spite of the company's huge sales force and its highly trained repair network.
While Xerox had set up a lavishly funded laboratory in Webster, New York, that research facility was more concerned with exploiting the remaining advantages of existing patents rather than developing new technologies for the future. In other words, the Webster facility was looking backwards, preserving revenue streams rather than creating wealth.
In spite of the complacency of many in the top ranks of Xerox leadership, Chief Executive C. Peter McColough began to seek to diversify he company into data processing. After all, he was aware of the efforts of both IBM and Kodak to enter the copier field. Thus, he developed a rather fluffy visionary presentation, which claimed that Xerox would create "the office of the future" as well as a new "architecture of information".
To help him to realize this vision, McColough hired Jack Goldman from Ford, where as Chief Scientist he had long been frustrated by the lack of interest in the innovations that his team had developed. Goldman came up with a plan for a research facility entirely separate from the applications-driven Webster facility, a place where basic research could be conducted at a remove from the everyday concerns of Xerox headquarters. McColough gave Goldman an unusually free hand, to open a kind of "research hermitage" whose mission would be to devise technologies "10 years ahead of their time".
For a variety of reasons, Goldman's timing was extremely lucky. First, in large part because of funding from the U.S. Department of Defense for the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), computer technologies were in an unusual state of ferment, an "inflection point" that carried great promise. Not only was the architecture of the mainframe computer reaching its limits by the early 1960s - they were massive and cumbersome machines that researchers had to share, with programming languages so obscure and counter-intuitive that non-specialists found them impossible to operate - but the price of semiconductor memory chips was falling as their complexity and capabilities were increasing exponentially. In addition, the ARPANET had just been invented, which could link computers into communication networks; it was the direct technological precursor to the internet. Finally, a number of visionaries in various universities and labs were pursuing a wide array of fundamental innovations; these included the development of "software" for graphical user interfaces, the "mouse" control to execute commands with a cursor on a television-like screen, and many other devices. If combined properly, these technologies promised to fundamentally transform the computer industry, making computers affordable for the individual as well as easier to use for the layman.
Second, with the Vietnam War swallowing up Defense Department resources, funding for ARPA had dropped abruptly by 1969. It had become, in Hiltzik's words, "a buyer's market for research and engineering talent."
Sensing an opportunity, PARC director George Pake invited Bob Taylor, one of ARPA's top research managers, to visit the facility he was establishing. During the mid-1960s, Taylor had run ARPA's research information-processing program for graphic user interfaces and computer networks. He was gifted, according to his peers, with an "instinctive grasp of the promise of man-computer interaction". Perhaps more important, he was reputed to have "an exceptionally high degree" of leadership and people skills: he could find talent, motivate people to work together towards a common goal, and yet refrain from imposing his own solutions on a problem, in effect allowing the best to do what they did best. In July, 1970, Pake hired Taylor to lead the Computer Science Laboratory (CSL) at PARC; he immediately (and successfully) set out to lure the best researchers to PARC from the network he had created (and funded) while at ARPA.
Taylor created a flat organization, in which CSL members reported directly - and only - to him. This placed him at the heart of the laboratory, aware of what everyone was doing, what they hoped to accomplish, and where they needed to improve. While he directed research with clear end goals in mind, Taylor operated largely as a mediator of ideas, trusting team members to devise the optimal combination of solutions to a given problem or goal; he knew that they were far better qualified than he was to address the various technical challenges. In his view, by helping his researchers to communicate with each other and understand the gestalt of CSL's evolving technologies, he would ensure that the pieces of each project would fit together into a concrete product that would be able to function. It was, in Hiltzik's words, as if CSL "worked like orchestra members, composing and rehearsing a symphony at the same time."
The atmosphere of CSL was freewheeling and personable, full of excitment. They formed a peer group of pioneers, a self-conscious elite that resembled a cult. Taylor's team eventually totaled between 40 and 50 members, by some measures fully two-thirds of the best computer researchers then alive. And they knew it.
Over the next three years, CSL created the Alto, the first programmable personal computer that was user friendy: with mouse, a graphics-oriented monitor, with "icons" and overlapping "pages", an object-oriented programming language and even an ethernet capabilty.
Unfortunately, few at Xerox headquarters understood the importance of these developments. From its beginning, many executives at Xerox headquarters viewed PARC as a kind of uncontrollable island of insolence and arrogance. For their part, PARC researchers viewed headquarters with open disdain at the leadership's inability to understand what PARC was doing. The mutual distrust between headquarters and its Palo Alto lab neither encouraged Xerox executives to learn about how PARC's inventions might fit into the modern office nor enabled PARC's managers to sell their inventions to the company's manufacturing units.
Perhaps worst of all, at this time - mid 70s - Japanese copier manufacturers executed a stunning strategy that succeeded in turning Xerox's supposed comparative advantages (its sales forces and repair facilities and its reliance on patented bits of technology) into liabilities. The Japanese copiers were easier to install, much much cheaper (to buy outright rather than lease and then pay for individual copies), and far less costly to fix. The company was thus suddenly in a fight for its life, after more than a decade as an unchallenged monopoly that had grown flabby.
As a result, PARC's incredibly fecund inventions never got the attention of top Xerox managers, who were too busy studying the TQM methods of the Japanese (an effort that did eventually pay off). As such, it was Apple and MS and IBM who used their ideas to dominate the emerging industry for affordable PCs. (That there were really so few inventions that have created the driving force of Silicon Valley is another story, but also a sign of how over-hyped its accomplishments have been in my humble opinion. In just about every sense, the Alto was the basic prototype of the personal computer of today - it has been refined and incrementally improved, but hardly changed in any fundamental way since 1973.)
Finally, the author does add a lot as a reporter, including an interesting interpretation of Jobs' mythic visit to PARC in 1979: rather than the entrepreneurial epiphany it was touted as, Hiltzik argues that Jobs and his team knew exactly what they were looking for and used PARC's inventions less as an inspiration than as a confirmation of what Apple was plannng to do. This chapter alone is worth the price of admission. THere can be no doubt that Hiltzik is a thoughtful observer who pounded the pavement: he gets the basics right and unearths many details that will be of use to academics.
This is a fascinating tale, but much of this book gets lost in the details of software development, arcana that only true geeks or technology historians should care to look at such a level of minutia. Unfortunately, Hiltzik tries to make it into something far more heroic and dramatic than I think it should be, complete with endless - in my view needlessly romanticized - characterizations of the geeks that did it. Thus, this often lost me, even though I found it extremely useful and informative for a writing project on PARC. While this perspective is personal, and I do not mean to demean the audiences that it would please, I am tryng to warn general non-specialist readers (like me) that it is in certain respects too detailed and in my opinion over-reaching.
Recommended with these caveats in mind. It is a great reference book, but not always that fun a read. I would give this 3.5 stars.
An Extremely Good Book About Computer R & D History July 17, 2006 1 out of 1 found this review helpful
I do not know why this book was never more popular. It is a great read and has lots of detail on the evolution of computer R&D.
It is a very well written and detailed book about the computer R&D from Boston-Washington to Palo Alto at HP - written like a smooth flowing novel. It is mainly about Xerox and the research people and how they eventually decided to move the computer R&D to California. But it includes a lot more stuff. It Includes DARPA funding of the internet and work at MIT, and in house fighting at Xerox, and then the evolution of the projects in California. Xerox did not run with the ball in an effective way post 1980 but the technology and people went on to other companies such as Microsoft, Apple, and HP. Also there was a lot of innovative work that was transferred to industry.
It gives a lot of insight into the evolution of computer systems and the internet and local networks and on and on. It covers the people - grad students, scientists, spin off companies, crazed computer types working all night - that are just as interesting as the wires and machines.
Great book, one of the best ever Tech Books.
Excellent history of a major player in computing history June 28, 2005 5 out of 6 found this review helpful
I found this an excellent, well-written overview of the history of Xerox's Palo Alto Research Center (PARC). Not only are major players and products covered (the Alto, Smalltalk, Alan Kay), but the background and collateral history appears as well (DARPA, Vannevar Bush, J.C. Licklider, The Spacewar article in Rolling Stone). Much like Steven Levy's book Hackers, reading this book makes you feel like an expert, like you were there. Moreover, there is so much context and excitement, one feels compelled to find out more about the secondary characters mentioned. Fortunately, electronic copies of such seminal pieces as the Spacewar article and Bush's "As We May Think" essay are easily found online, making quick diversions into supplemental reading not only of interest, but also possible and highly recommended. That is the real beauty of this book: it provides enough information about other relevant topics without wandering too far down tangential paths. I really felt that I learned a lot by reading this book, and my learning wasn't limited to Xerox PARC.
That said, while there is a strong focus on the early history/founding of PARC, it seems that the more recent history is skimmed over if not omitted. After the rich background I encountered in the book's early chapters, I felt as if things were moving a bit fast in the later ones.
Bottom line: If you are interested in the history of computing then this is a must read book.
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